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Introduction 
Until a jury convicted him for conspiring to launder money and for 
money laundering in July 2011,1 Álvaro López Tardón enjoyed an 
opulent lifestyle replete with “fancy cars, seaside condos, designer 
jewelry, and expensive leather goods.”2 As “the alleged leader of Spain’s 
Los Miami drug gang,”3 he trafficked an estimated 7,500 kilograms of 
cocaine from South America to Spain and “launder[ed] more than $14 
million in illegal drug proceeds in the United States.”4 López Tardón 
purchased more than a dozen Miami condos between 2001 and 2006, 
using cashier’s checks to purchase the properties directly from 
 
1. United States v. Tardón, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1309, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
2. Drug Kingpin Dethroned: International Investigation Dismantles Criminal 
Enterprise, FBI (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/drug-
kingpin-dethroned [https://perma.cc/5RMS-AAMZ]. 
3. Frederick Reese, How to Launder Drug Money: Start an LLC and Buy Real 
Estate, Mint Press News (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.mintpressnews 
 .com/how-to-launder-drug-money-start-an-llc-and-buy-real-estate/168778/ 
[https://perma.cc/YTT6-XFF9]. 
4. Drug Kingpin Dethroned, supra note 2; see also Tardón, 56 F. Supp. 3d 
at 1314 (“Tardon distributed multi-thousand kilograms of cocaine in Europe, 
which he directly imported from South America, and caused to be 
imported in to Spain. He then laundered $14,358,639.64 in illicit narcotics 
proceeds from the sale of said cocaine in the United States.”). 
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developers.5 Relying on illicit funds, López Tardón bought real estate 
“under the name of a shell company or straw buyer, including 11 
purchases” at two high-end Miami condominium complexes.6 
López Tardón allegedly laundered money by importing cocaine into 
Spain, then sending the proceeds to the United States using either 
couriers or wire transfers to dummy accounts.7 Then, using straw buyers 
and shell companies, he purchased, among other things, luxury real 
estate in and around Miami.8 The FBI estimated that, between 2004 
and 2011, López Tardón brought more than $26,000,000 in drug 
proceeds into the United States.9 
In many ways, López Tardón’s actions are textbook money 
laundering.10 After obtaining proceeds from the sale of cocaine, he 
 
5. Jay Weaver, Miami Jury Convicts Reputed Spaniard Drug Kingpin of 
Money-laundering, Miami Herald (June 11, 2014, 1:08 PM), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/ 
 article1965898.html [https://perma.cc/AY56-XFLU] (“Before his arrest 
in 2011, López Tardón, 39, went on a wild spending spree. He snapped up 
13 high-priced condos, including a $1 million-plus penthouse at the 
Continuum in South Beach, and 17 luxury cars, including a 2008 black 
Bugatti Veyron for $1.2 million and a 2003 black Ferrari Enzo for almost 
$1 million.”); Reese, supra note 3. 
6. Jay Weaver, Reputed Spanish Drug Lord on Trial for Laundering Millions 
in Miami, Miami Herald (June 5, 2014), https://www.miamiherald.com/ 
 news/local/community/miami-dade/article1965525.html [https://perma 
 .cc/8YRV-BKLG]. Shell companies are “set up, usually offshore, complete 
with bank accounts in which money can reside during the layering phase.” 
Peter Reuter & Edwin M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money 31 
(2004). 
7. Drug Kingpin Dethroned, supra note 2. 
8. Id. 
9. International Drug Money Laundering Indictment Unsealed, FBI (July 
14, 2011), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/miami/press-releases/2011/ 
 international-drug-money-laundering-indictment-unsealed [https://perma 
 .cc/52SU-BZG5]. 
10. See Ass’n of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists, Study 
Guide: CAMS Certification Exam 2–3 (6th ed. 2016). “[M]oney 
laundering is the process of making dirty money look clean.” Id. at 1. The 
Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (ACAMS) 
identifies three stages of money laundering: placement, layering, and 
integration. Id. at 2–3. Placement consists of “[t]he physical disposal of 
cash or other assets derived from criminal activity,” and routinely involves 
depositing funds with legitimate businesses. Id. at 2. Layering entails 
separating “illicit proceeds from their source by layers of financial 
transactions intended to conceal the origin of the proceeds.” Id. at 3. 
Layering normally consists of “converting the proceeds of the crime into 
another form and creating complex layers of financial transactions to 
obfuscate the source and ownership of funds.” Id. The final stage, 
integration, consists of “[s]upplying apparent legitimacy to illicit wealth 
through the re-entry of the funds into the economy in what appear[] to be 
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arranged to move the illegally obtained funds from Spain to the United 
States.11 He concealed the origin of the funds through a series of 
transactions that gave his wealth a patina of legitimacy—specifically, 
he associated his ill-gotten wealth with a luxury car dealership and a 
gourmet shop in Madrid.12 Ultimately, López Tardón integrated his 
illegal funds into the licit financial system through seemingly legitimate, 
if extravagant, transactions.13 
Despite the volume of his internationally financed luxury real estate 
purchases, López Tardón’s empire was unraveled not by an analyst 
combing through spreadsheets to detect abnormal transactions—like 
one man purchasing thirteen luxury condominiums—but through the 
cooperation of his associates and confidantes.14 The Los Miami gang’s 
scheme began to unravel when authorities apprehended López Tardón’s 
Santería priest, Vincente Orlando Cardelle, smuggling cash through 
Miami International Airport.15 Prosecutors relied on testimony from 
López Tardón’s “one-time partner . . . to establish[] that López Tardón 
was involved in drug trafficking.”16 López Tardón’s ex-girlfriend, who 
pled guilty to money laundering charges related to the Los Miami drug 
gang, “acknowledged investing [López Tardón’s] drug profits in Miami’s 
soaring condominium market.”17 Ultimately, identifying and flipping 
members of López Tardón’s inner circle, not the movement of millions 
of dollars in international wire transfers through anonymous shell 
companies, proved instrumental to bringing down the Los Miami gang.18 
United States District Judge Joan Lenard sentenced López Tardón 
to 150 years’ imprisonment.19 “After his conviction, federal agents seized 
 
normal business or personal transactions.” Id. Integration “entails using 
laundered proceeds in seemingly normal transactions to create the 
perception of legitimacy.” Id. ACAMS notes that “money laundering can 
be achieved through virtually every medium, financial institution or 
business.” Id. at 1. See generally Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, Money Laundering: A Banker’s Guide to Avoiding 
Problems (2002). 
11. Drug Kingpin Dethroned, supra note 2. 
12. Weaver, supra note 5. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id.; Brian Hamacher, 5 Busted in Miami Drug Money Laundering Ring, 
NBC Miami (July 14, 2011, 1:20 PM), https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/ 
 local/5-Busted-in--125576373.html [https://perma.cc/E5NV-KPVJ]. 
16. Weaver, supra note 5. 
17. Id. 
18. See id. 
19. Jay Weaver, Spaniard López Tardón Sent to Prison for 150 Years in 
Miami Money-Laundering Case, Miami Herald (Sept. 29, 2014), 
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[López Tardón’s] illegally obtained assets, ‘including a fleet of luxury 
cars and [thirteen] condos.’”20 At sentencing, Judge Lenard described 
Miami as “replete with people who utilize illegal funds and live a 
luxurious, unbelievable lifestyle.”21 Since the so-called “Cocaine 
Cowboys” era in the 1980s,22 money launderers like López Tardón have 
helped spur demand for luxury Miami real estate.23 
Miami real estate is attractive to homebuyers for many reasons. 
The warm weather, sandy beaches, glamorous nightlife, metropolitan 
atmosphere, thriving international commerce, distinctive architecture, 
and syncretic culture are among the many legitimate reasons people 
choose to purchase high-end real estate in Miami.24 Although Florida is 
the most popular state for foreign buyers who seek to purchase U.S. 
real estate,25 five states—Florida, California, Texas, New York, and 
Arizona—account for 53% of total foreign-buyer residential real estate 
purchases.26 
Nothing is inherently wrong with attracting customers from 
overseas. In the aftermath of the housing bubble that spurred the 2008 
financial crisis, Miami’s luxury real estate market flourished despite 




20. Gary McPherson, Comment, Floating on a Sea of Funny Money, 26 U. 
Miami Bus. L. Rev. 159, 172 (2017) (quoting Nicholas Nehamas, How 
Secret Offshore Money Helps Fuel Miami’s Luxury Real-Estate Boom, 
Miami Herald (Apr. 3, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/ 
 news/business/real-estate-news/article69248462.html#storylink=cpy 
[https://perma.cc/T7M6-DDVK]). 
21. Weaver, supra note 19.  
22. McPherson, supra note 20, at 161. 
23. Id.; Ken Silverstein, Miami: Where Luxury Real Estate Meets Dirty 
Money, The Nation (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/ 
 miami-where-luxury-real-estate-meets-dirty-money/ [https://perma.cc/ 
 VZ4M-J7T6]). 
24. See, e.g., Phyllis McIntosh, Miami, Florida: The Magic City, 3 Eng. 
Teaching F. 35, 35–37, 39, 41, 44 (2008); see also Silverstein, supra note 
23 (quoting an anonymous Russian realtor as saying, “Miami is a 
brand. People from all over the world want property here.”). 
25. See Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, Profile of International Transactions 
in U.S. Residential Real Estate 9 (2018) (noting that Florida accounts 
for 19% of all residential property purchases by foreigners in the United 
States; California, the next most popular state for foreign real estate 
purchasers, accounts for 14% of all such transactions). 
26. Id. 
27. Silverstein, supra note 23. 
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constitute a large proportion of Miami real estate purchasers,28 are more 
likely than other buyers to purchase real estate through all-cash 
transactions.29 In some markets, such as Florida’s Miami-Dade County, 
all-cash transactions have, in some years, constituted roughly half of all 
residential real estate sales.30 These characteristics also make Miami a 
popular destination for potential abuse. As FinCEN’s Advisory to 
Financial Institutions and Real Estate Firms and Professionals noted, 
“[m]any all-cash transactions are routine and legitimate, [but] they also 
present significant opportunities for exploitation by illicit actors.”31 
All-cash transactions—those conducted “without a mortgage or 
other credit financing,” pose an extremely high risk from an anti-money 
laundering (AML) perspective.32 This is because the U.S. Bank Secrecy 
Act and other AML requirements do not effectively cover parties to all-
cash transactions.33 In many instances, American “[r]eal estate agents, 
brokers and developers, lawyers, and accountants and others involved 
in the buying and selling of real estate are not covered by anti-money 
 
28. See Nicholas Nehamas, How Secret Offshore Money Helps Fuel 
Miami’s Luxury Real-Estate Boom, Miami Herald (Apr. 3, 2016, 2:00 
PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/real-estate-news/ 
 article69248462.html#storylink=cpy [https://perma.cc/T7M6-DDVK] 
(noting that in 2015 foreign buyers made 25% of home purchases in 
Miami-Dade County); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, supra note 25 
(noting that in 2018 foreign buyers made up 33% of closed sales in Miami). 
29. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, supra note 25 (“Most non-resident foreign buyers 
made an all-cash purchase (72[%]), while a smaller fraction of resident 
foreign buyers paid all-cash (30[%]).”); id. at 24 (“Foreign buyers are more 
likely to pay cash than all existing home buyers. Forty-seven percent of 
reported transactions [by foreign buyers] were all-cash sales, compared to 
21[%] for all existing home purchases.”). 
30. Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network (FinCEN), U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
Advisory to Financial Institutions and Real Estate Firms and 
Professionals 4 (2017) (noting that, of 13,164 closed sales for single 
family homes in Miami-Dade County in 2016, 4,024 were paid in cash); 
Miami Ass’n of Realtors, Yearly Market Summary—2016: 
Townhouses and Condos (2017) (noting that, of 13,604 closed sales for 
townhouses and condos in Miami-Dade County in 2016, 8,209 were paid 
in cash.)). Thus, all-cash sales accounted for 45.7% of all home sales in 
Miami-Dade County in 2016. 
31. FinCEN, supra note 30. 
32. Mitchell Lincoln, ACAMS, Auditing to the Inherent Risks of 
Real Estate Gatekeepers 6 (2017) (“The use of all-cash transactions 
cannot be understated as a potential money laundering concern. It enables 
large sums of money to be integrated into the U.S. financial system with 
little to no traceability. Illicit actors who purchase real estate in cash may 
utilize the property for asset preservation, rent the property to obtain 
income or sell the property[,] making it difficult to trace back the monies 
to their original origins.”), available at https://www.acams.org/aml-white-
paper-auditing-real-estate-gatekeepers/ [https://perma.cc/4L8M-DKYV]. 
33. Id. at 5. 
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laundering laws, and therefore are not required to conduct due diligence 
on customers.”34 Unlike real estate transactions financed through 
traditional loans, in which lenders who are subject to AML reporting 
requirements must collect and maintain detailed records about 
transacting parties, all-cash transactions had, until recently, entailed 
no comparable requirements on the professionals who conduct real 
estate transactions.35 
For money launderers, real estate is an ideal laundering 
mechanism.36 Through commercial and residential real estate, money 
launderers can obscure the illicit origins of their funds or use real estate 
to operate “legitimate front businesses, particularly if they are cash 
intensive.”37 Once money launderers acquire real estate, that property 
“can readily serve as collateral in further layering transactions.”38 
Historically, money launderers have bought and sold real estate “under 
false names [using] shell corporations.”39 Shell companies afford 
numerous advantages to their beneficial owners, including preferential 
tax treatment, estate planning advantages, limited liability, and 
anonymity.40  
The United States does a particularly poor job of regulating shell 
companies. A 2011 World Bank report concluded that, with respect to 
obtaining identifying information regarding beneficial ownership, the 
United States was “[b]y far the worst performer of the countries 
reviewed.”41 In the United States, most company-registration services 
 
34. Maíra Martini, Transparency Int’l, Doors Wide Open: Corruption 
and Real Estate in Four Key Markets 18 (2017). 
35. Lincoln, supra note 32, at 4 (“[Real estate] professionals [were] under no 
legal obligation to establish an AML compliance program, identify 
customers, conduct due diligence and report suspicious transactions.”). 
But see, e.g., FinCEN, Geographic Targeting Order Covering Title 
Insurance Company (2018), available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/ 
 default/files/shared/Real%20Estate%20GTO%20GENERIC_111518_FI
NAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/755B-9E3S]. 




40. George L. Metcalfe Jr., The Estate and Tax Planning Benefits of Shell 
Corporations, 97 Prac. Tax Strategies 252, 252–55 (2016). 
41. Emile van der Does de Willebois et al., Stolen Asset Recovery 
(STAR) Initiative, WBG, The Puppet Masters 92 (2011) (“Out of 
[twenty-seven] service providers under U.S. jurisdiction returning a valid 
response, only [three] said they asked for any form of identity 
documentation, whereas the others ([twenty-four]) were prepared to form 
companies without conducting any due diligence whatsoever.”), available 
at https://star.worldbank.org/sites/star/files/puppetmastersv1.pdf [https:// 
 perma.cc/US9L-CXFM]. 
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providers “did not ask for any proof of identification” for nonresidents 
who attempted to use their services, despite the fact that company-
registration service providers are required to obtain a valid employer 
identification number for nonresidents.42 Some states’ company-
registration service providers are especially accommodating to 
nonresidents: “[S]ome providers in Wyoming and Nevada actually 
offered to use their employees’ Social Security numbers to spare clients 
the need to obtain an [employer identification number].”43 The 
identification challenge is compounded “[b]ecause so little information 
is collected on U.S. companies, [making it] impossible to tell how many 
are shell companies and not operational companies.”44 Nevertheless, 
“U.S. law enforcement consistently has indicated that the number is 
high enough to cause grave concerns.”45 Money launderers value the 
anonymity shell corporations afford them because that anonymity 
enables them to avoid detection.46 
The risks associated with money laundering through real estate are 
significant. Laundered money is used to finance terrorist and human 
trafficking organizations, circumvent economic sanctions, trade in 
illegal drugs, and promote political corruption.47 The United Nations 
estimates that the “amount of money laundered globally in one year is 
2–5% of global GDP, or $800 billion [to] $2 trillion in [2017 U.S.] 




44. Casey Michel, The United States of Anonymity 11 (2017). 
45. van der Does de Willebois et al., supra note 41, at 93. 
46. Id. at 97 (“Many corporate vehicles that are used to launder money are 
established solely for the purpose of providing anonymous access to 
financial institutions.”). 
47. See Richard Malish, Are Lawyers Facilitating Money Laundering?, NICE 
Actimize (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.niceactimize.com/blog/are-
lawyers-facilitating-money-laundering-534/ [https://perma.cc/PS54-FUQK]; 
see also Michel, supra note 44, at 3. 
48. Money-Laundering and Globalization, U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/globalization.html 
[https://perma.cc/6TRX-WSPG] (last visited June 27, 2020). The $1.2 
trillion range in the estimate reflects the uncertainty inherent in 
estimating the scale of an activity which, by its nature, is riven with 
secrecy. The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime appears to recognize the 
methodological limits of estimating the total amount of laundered money 
circulating in the global financial system: “Because of the clandestine 
nature of money-laundering, it is difficult to estimate the total amount of 
money that goes through the [money laundering] cycle.” Id. Money 
laundering in such large amounts is not a new phenomenon: one 1993 
estimate “put the amount of money being derived from criminal 
enterprises and then laundered in the United States at approximately $300 
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AML organization, identified real estate “as a clear area of 
vulnerability,” noting that “[r]eal estate accounted for up to 30% of 
criminal assets confiscated” between 2011 and 2013.49 As López Tardón 
recognized, real estate is an especially attractive vehicle for money 
laundering. In addition to providing criminals with living space, social 
capital, and bases from which to conduct illicit activities, the sale of 
real estate can lend the appearance of legitimacy to laundered money.50 
As a result, “the purchase of real estate is a common outlet for criminal 
proceeds.”51 
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau 
of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, is responsible for 
“safeguard[ing] the financial system from illicit use and [combating] 
money laundering.”52 In recent years, FinCEN has taken steps to reduce 
anonymity in real estate transactions. Since 2016, FinCEN has required 
title insurance companies to report identifying information about 
participants in residential real estate transactions over a certain dollar 
threshold in select localities.53 But the limited scope of these efforts and 
the ample alternatives they leave money launderers indicates that more 
action is necessary. 
 
billion annually.” See Scott Sulzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the 
Problem and Attempts to Combat It, 63 Tenn. L. Rev. 143, 146 (1995). 
49. Fin. Action Task Force, Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 24 (2013), available 
at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML and TF 
vulnerabilities legal professionals.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG9J-AZXK]. 
50. See id. at 44. 
51. Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 49, at 44. 
52. What We Do, FinCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do [https:// 
 perma.cc/82X2-9Y3V] (last visited June 27, 2020). 
53. FinCEN Targets Shell Companies Purchasing Luxury Properties in Seven 
Major Metropolitan Areas, FinCEN (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.fincen 
 .gov/news/news-releases/fincen-targets-shell-companies-purchasing-luxury-
properties-seven-major [https://perma.cc/2FPE-Z556]. FinCEN requires 
title insurance companies to “fil[e] a FinCEN Currency Transaction Report[] 
within 30 days of the closings of the [covered transaction].” FinCEN, 
supra note 35, at 2. Federal regulations require some financial institutions 
to file currency transaction reports for transactions involving the use “of 
more than $10,000” in currency in most circumstances. See 31 C.F.R. 
§§ 1010.311, 1010.315 (2018). Currency transaction reports primarily 
exist to prevent companies and individuals from conducting anonymous 
cash transactions. See id. § 1010.312; FinCEN, Casino Industry: 
Currency Transaction Reporting 4 (2008), https://www.fincen.gov/ 
 sites/default/files/shared/CasinoIndustryCTRFilings.pdf [https://perma 
 .cc/M8NM-RBE5] (noting that “an initial objective of the BSA . . . was 
to require banks to report large cash transactions because the anonymity 
of cash made it an attractive vehicle for drug traffickers, tax evaders and 
persons engaged in organized crime”). 
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This Note addresses the United States’ reluctance to impose AML 
reporting requirements on persons involved in real estate transactions 
and how this reluctance facilitates money laundering on an immense 
scale. Requiring title insurance companies to report beneficial 
ownership information to FinCEN is a flawed proxy for identifying shell 
companies’ beneficial owners. The United States should require all shell 
companies, irrespective of whether they use services provided by 
financial institutions, to identify their beneficial owners to the 
Department of the Treasury. Requiring title insurance companies to 
report on all real estate transactions above an appropriate dollar 
threshold and requiring shell companies to report the identity of all 
beneficial owners are complementary approaches that together will 
reduce the United States’ attractiveness as a money laundering 
destination without unduly burdening financial institutions. 
In Part I, this Note examines the USA PATRIOT Act’s 
amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act, which require certain types of 
businesses to maintain AML compliance programs, as well as the non-
intuitive manner in which regulators applied these laws in the context 
of the real estate industry. Part II addresses the administrative 
obstacles and policy tradeoffs involved in pursuing a more robust AML 
policy through title insurance companies. Part III explores FinCEN’s 
approach to addressing money laundering through residential real 
estate, and concludes that FinCEN’s Geographic Targeting Orders 
(GTOs) have yielded valuable insights, but that requiring title 
insurance companies to report on beneficial ownership information 
entails significant inherent limitations. Part III also discusses the limits 
to an AML approach that relies on title insurance companies, and 
argues that the government should adopt a complementary approach 
that addresses anonymous shell companies. Part IV argues that 
Congress should pass legislation on two fronts: (1) requiring shell 
companies to disclose identifying information about their beneficial 
owners to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); and (2) requiring the 
IRS to make all such identifying information immediately available to 
FinCEN. Requiring shell companies to self-report identifying 
information about their beneficial owners would both reduce the burden 
on financial institutions and improve the efficacy of real estate-related 
AML compliance requirements. Rather than rely on imperfect proxies 
like title insurance companies to provide a modicum of transparency, 
legislation that looks to the source of the problem—state business 
entities that provide anonymity—will more effectively address the risks 
attendant with real estate-based money laundering. 
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I. Development of AML Law in the United States 
The United States has come under justified criticism for failing to 
limit the risks associated with real estate transactions.54 Despite 
pressures to conform to best practices advocated by international 
watchdogs, the United States has been slow to address the risks 
presented by real estate-related money laundering.55 To better examine 
the origins of the United States’ institutional failures to more zealously 
police money laundering through real estate transactions, an 
examination of the complex relationship between legal, historical, and 
economic forces is in order. 
The United States enacted the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) in 1986.56 
Initially conceived as a way to encourage financial institutions to 
monitor their own activities, the BSA required financial institutions to 
assess the risk presented by their customers and to report suspicious 
activities to regulatory authorities.57 By assembling information about 
potential financial crimes and centralizing it in FinCEN, the BSA gave 
law enforcement the tools to prosecute domestic money laundering and 
financial crimes more effectively.58 Despite initial successes in increasing 
the difficulty and cost of laundering money in the United States, 
“sophisticated launderers and criminals began almost immediately to 
take advantage of the increasingly open, and porous, global financial 
system.”59 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. government and 
 
54. Lincoln, supra note 32, at 4. 
55. See Kevin L. Shepherd, The USA PATRIOT Act: The Complexities of 
Imposing Anti-Money Laundering Obligations on the Real Estate 
Industry, 39 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 403, 420–22 (2004); Fin. Action 
Task Force & Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering, Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures—
United States 39 (2016), available at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/ 
 fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-States-2016.pdf [https:// 
 perma.cc/XK8Y-9ZYY]. 
56. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C. 
(2018)); Robert E. Sims & Leah Castella, The USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001: New Obligations and Opportunities in the Fight Against Global 
Money Laundering, Andrews’ Bank & Lender Liab. Litig. Rep., Dec. 
20, 2001, at 1, 1. 
57. Sims & Castella, supra note 56. 
58. Id. (noting that money laundering “investigations were hampered by the 
inability to secure evidence of financial transactions and criminal activities 
that occurred beyond U.S. borders”). 
59. Id. (estimating that, in 2001, “professional money launderers charge their 
clients as much as 25[%] more than they did [in 1986], a fee increase that 
reflects the increased risk and cost the launderer now faces in America.”). 
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international organizations sought to develop methods to combat 
international money laundering.60 
In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act amended the Bank Secrecy Act 
to require financial institutions to establish AML compliance programs 
and set minimum requirements for those programs.61 The statute 
defines twenty-seven categories of “financial institution,” ranging from 
more traditional financial entities—such as banks, securities brokers, 
and credit unions62—to “persons involved in real estate closings and 
settlements.”63 
The BSA authorizes the Department of the Treasury to issue 
GTOs.64 GTOs are temporary orders through which the Secretary of 
the Treasury may require “any domestic financial institution . . . in a 
geographic area . . . to obtain such information as the Secretary may 
describe . . . concerning [certain transactions and the persons who 
participate in them]; to maintain a record of [that] information;” and 
to report on such transactions.65 The USA PATRIOT Act extended the 
maximum effective period for GTOs from sixty days to 180 days.66 The 
Secretary of the Treasury may renew a GTO if “reasonable grounds 
exist for concluding that additional recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements are necessary.”67 Consequently, while GTOs are ostensibly 
temporary measures, in practice the Secretary can indefinitely extend 
GTOs. 
In 2003, FinCEN attempted to define “persons involved in real 
estate closings and settlements.”68 But, in part because of opposition 
 
60. Id. 
61. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 352, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) 
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2018)) (amending the Bank 
Secrecy Act to require financial institutions to develop “internal policies, 
procedures, and controls;” designate “a compliance officer;” maintain “an 
ongoing employee training program;” and establish “an independent audit 
function to test programs”); see also Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311, 
5318, 5312, 5326 (2018). 
62. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(A)–(H) (2018). 
63. Id. § 5312(a)(2)(U). 
64. Id. § 5326(a). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. § 5326(d). 
67. Id. § 5326(a). 
68. Andrew A. Lance et al., Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200: FinCEN 
Imposes Temporary Reporting Requirements on Title Insurance Companies 
for All Cash Luxury Real Estate Transactions in Manhattan and Miami, 
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from groups operating within or adjacent to the real estate industry, 
FinCEN temporarily abandoned the project.69 In particular, lawyers—
who routinely play prominent roles in real estate closings—and groups 
representing lawyers opposed rules that could conflict with the 
attorney-client privilege and client confidentiality.70 Commentators had 
harshly criticized the “troubling ambiguities lurking in the phrase 
‘persons involved in real estate closings and settlements’” as posing 
significant practical challenges to enforcement, increasing the 
compliance cost for persons involved in real estate closings and 
settlements, and conflicting with the ethical duties of attorneys.71 The 
legal community’s response to additional reporting requirements on 
“persons involved in real estate closings and settlements” included 
practical objections rooted in the logistics of real estate closings, as well 
as categorical ethical objections.72 
 
Real estate industry groups have historically opposed attempts by 
FinCEN to impose additional reporting requirements on persons involved 
in real estate closings and settlements, raising concerns that “AML 
requirements would impose onerous burdens on the real estate industry 
with no corresponding benefit to the fight against money laundering and 
terrorist financing.” See Shepherd, supra note 55, at 421. 
69. Lance et al., supra note 68; Shepherd, supra note 55, at 421. 
70. Shepherd, supra note 55, at 430; see also Letter from Louis B. Guttman, 
Chair-Elect, Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the Florida 
Bar Ass’n, to FinCEN, at 2 (June 9, 2003) (“[T]he inclusion of real estate 
attorneys within the USA PATRIOT Act [AML reporting] requirement 
would . . . impose on real estate attorneys a duty to conduct basic due 
diligence on the identity of their clients—which would cause clients to feel 
distrustful of their attorney and would discourage clients from 
communicating fully and frankly with their attorney; and . . . impose on 
real estate attorneys a de facto obligation to report questionable 
transactions to law enforcement authorities-thus conflicting with 
longstanding rules of client confidentiality and attorney-client privilege.”), 
available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/guttmann.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZP8T-FHWX]. 
71. Shepherd, supra note 55, at 406. The language of 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(u) 
(2018) is inherently ambiguous. Read in the broadest light, a part-time 
realtor selling a modest home—as “persons involved in real estate closings 
and settlements”—could be required to implement an AML compliance 
program. Thus, “regulatory action is required to enumerate the persons 
that would fit into this category.” Lance et al., supra note 68. 
72. See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 55; Letter from Sanford A. Weiner, 
President, Am. Coll. of Real Estate Lawyers, to FinCEN, at 4 n.1 (June 
9, 2003) (“Commercial real estate transactions are carefully scheduled to 
close and settle to coincide with the business interests and objectives of 
the parties. Delays will be costly and may threaten the successful 
consummation of transactions.”), available at https://www.fincen.gov/ 
 sites/default/files/shared/weiner.pdf [https://perma.cc/KHA6-9FTR]; 
Letter from Louis B. Guttman to FinCEN, supra note 70, at 2. 
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Although lawyers and legal trade groups criticized the proposed 
increased AML reporting requirements, the legal profession represents 
a weak link in the U.S. AML enforcement program.73 But addressing 
 
73. See Secret Companies Allow Corrupt Cash to Flood the Biggest Real 
Estate Markets, Transparency Int’l (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www 
 .transparency.org/news/pressrelease/secret_companies_allow_corrupt_
cash_to_flood_the_biggest_real_estate_market [https://perma.cc/ 
 KR4J-4RDQ] (“Australia, Canada and the U.S. rely almost exclusively 
on banks to stop money laundering, even though a slew of middlemen 
including real estate agents, accountants, tax planners, lawyers and others 
participate in deal-making. This makes all-cash deals, which do not 
require the involvement of a bank and which represent a significant 
proportion of high-end sales made to overseas investors, especially difficult 
to track.”). 
  Lawyers’ peculiar role as financial intermediaries who are ethically 
bound to preserve client confidentiality presents a risk for abuse. In one 
exposé performed by the transparency advocacy group Global Witness, a 
person posing as an adviser to a minister of a foreign government sought 
advice from thirteen law firms on how best to move money into the United 
States while avoiding detection. Lowering the Bar, Global Witness 
(Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/loweringthebar 
[https://perma.cc/ZS3U-5SRW]. At twelve of the thirteen firms Global 
Witness approached, lawyers “suggested using anonymously-owned 
companies or trusts to hide the fictitious minister’s assets,” and 
“recommended using American companies.” Id. Among the attorneys 
Global Witness interviewed, some “suggested using their law firms’ own 
bank accounts to help prevent U.S. banks detecting who the money 
belonged to; some also suggested that they themselves become a trustee 
of an offshore trust and use this position to open a bank account.” Id. 
  Two commentators indicated that the twelve attorneys who provided 
advice on how best to bring suspicious funds into the United States “made 
scant effort to explore [the possibility that the requested assistance would 
violate U.S. AML statutes] or to undertake necessary due diligence,” 
presenting “themselves as willing enablers of transactions to conceal 
ownership of assets without exploring . . . the legal limits on such 
transactions.” Memorandum from John Leubsdorf, Professor of Law at 
Rutgers Sch. L., and William H. Simon, Arthur Levitt Professor at 
Columbia L. Sch., to Global Witness (Jan. 25, 2015), available at 
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/loweringthebar [https://perma.cc/ 
 ZS3U-5SRW].  
  The norms of confidentiality that shroud the legal profession mean 
that “conduct such as that of these lawyers would not normally come to 
light.” Id. Striking a balance between preserving the attorney-client 
relationship and preventing the laundering of illicit funds through real 
property implicates policy choices about, among other things, privacy, 
administrative efficiency, criminal justice, and legal ethics. Though this 
Note focuses primarily on reducing the anonymity that facilitates money 
laundering through real estate, an updated discussion is necessary of how 
best to address the money laundering risks presented by attorneys. See 
Shepherd, supra note 55, at 420–22 (discussing the risks for attorneys 
related to money laundering); see also Armen Adzhemyan & Susan M. 
Marcella, “Better Call Saul” if You Want Discoverable Communications: 
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this weakness directly through the imposition of reporting requirements 
on attorneys threatened to substantially increase the risk and expense 
of compliance for attorneys without concomitantly reducing the risks of 
money laundering.74 As one commentator noted, “lawyers may not be 
in the best position to detect money laundering and terrorist financing 
activities.”75 
Recognizing the high potential costs of including attorneys within 
the definition of “persons involved in real estate closings and 
settlements,” and seemingly acknowledging challenges the real estate 
industry faced in the wake of the Great Recession, FinCEN for more 
than a decade avoided imposing potentially burdensome regulatory 
requirements on the real estate industry.76 Until 2016, FinCEN broadly 
exempted persons involved in real estate closings and settlements from 
AML reporting requirements imposed on other financial institutions.77 
 
The Misrepresentation of the Attorney-Client Privilege on Breaking Bad, 
45 N.M. L. Rev. 477, 479 (2015) (addressing the circumstances in which 
“a lawyer’s involvement with a legitimate business transaction using illicit 
funds vitiate[s] the attorney-client privilege”). 
74. Shepherd, supra note 55, at 434 n.140 (“[A] real estate lawyer may be 
retained to play a tangential role as special or local counsel in reviewing 
and commenting on transaction documents prepared by others or in 
delivering a legal opinion on the enforceability of a transaction document 
under local law, or in performing solely property-related due diligence 
investigations (such as title and survey review or analysis of zoning 
entitlements). In none of these types of activities is the lawyer likely to 
find, or even be in a position to discover, potential ‘red flags’ suggesting 
that one or more of the parties may be seeking to engage in money 
laundering or may be providing financial support for terrorist activities.”) 
Without a “demonstrable cost-benefit to such an undertaking,” an 
interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(U) (2018) that excludes many 
attorneys who participate in real estate transactions would avoid undue 
compliance costs. See Letter from Sanford A. Weiner to FinCEN, supra 
note 72, at 8. 
75. Shepherd, supra note 55, at 434 & n.140. 
76. Lance et al., supra note 68. (“Because most real estate transactions 
involve some form of financing, and are thus subject to the AML scrutiny 
imposed by financial institutions, FinCEN has been reluctant to impose 
potentially duplicative requirements on the rest of the industry.”). 
77. Martini, supra note 34, at 18 (“The USA PATRIOT ACT 2001 originally 
contained provisions that required those involved in real estate closings 
to perform due diligence on their customers, but they were granted a 
temporary exemption from that requirement by the Treasury Department, 
which has never been lifted.”); see also 31 C.F.R. § 1010.205(b)(1)(v) 
(2018) (exempting “[persons] involved in real estate closings and settlements” 
from the requirement to “establis[h] anti-money laundering programs”). 
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II. Modern Developments: Using GTOs to Require 
Title Insurance Companies to Perform Reporting and 
Recordkeeping Functions 
The policy of broadly exempting persons involved in real estate 
closings and settlements from AML reporting requirements shifted on 
January 13, 2016, when FinCEN issued two GTOs “requiring [title 
insurance companies, their subsidiaries and agents] to collect and report 
information about the persons involved in certain residential real estate 
transactions” in Miami-Dade County and Manhattan.78 Finding 
that “additional reporting requirements . . . are necessary to carry out 
the purposes of the Bank Secrecy Act,” FinCEN used the GTO 
mechanism to create additional recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements on title insurance companies.79 The January 2016 GTOs 
covered “real property (including individual units of condominiums and 
cooperatives) designed principally for the occupancy of from one to four 
families.”80 
The January 2016 GTOs defined “covered transactions,” 
enumerating the kinds of legal entities and financial instruments, 
geographic locations, and purchase prices that would trigger reporting 
requirements for title insurance companies on customers who lack 
external financing.81 The GTOs required title insurance companies that 
conduct covered transactions to report to FinCEN all such transactions 
 
78. FinCEN, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Geographic Targeting 
Order: Miami (2016), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/ 
 Real_Estate_GTO-MIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZQ6-JDUP] [hereinafter 
FinCEN, Miami GTO]; FinCEN, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
Geographic Targeting Order: Manhattan (2016), https://www.fincen 
 .gov/sites/default/files/shared/Real_Estate_GTO-NYC.pdf [https:// 
 perma.cc/BXL4-JYYZ] [hereinafter FinCEN, Manhattan GTO]. 
79. FinCEN Miami GTO, supra note 78, at 1; FinCEN Manhattan GTO, 
supra note 78, at 1. 
80. Frequently Asked Questions, FinCEN (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.fincen 
 .gov/sites/default/files/shared/FAQsRealEstateGTO.pdf [https://perma 
 .cc/6UEW-MM2Y]. Thus, real estate transactions for any other type of 
property are not subject to reporting requirements. 
81. FinCEN Miami GTO, supra note 78, at 1–2; FinCEN Manhattan 
GTO, supra note 78, at 1–2. A transaction was a “covered transaction” 
for the purposes of the GTOs if: (1) a legal entity (2) purchases residential 
real property located in [the selected county or borough] (3) for a total 
purchase price in excess of [$1,000,000 in Miami-Dade County; $3,000,000 
in the Borough of Manhattan], (4) such purchase is made without a bank 
loan or other similar form of external financing, and (5) it is made, at 
least in part, using currency or a cashier’s check, a certified check, a 
traveler’s check, or a money order in any form. FinCEN Miami GTO, 
supra note 78; FinCEN Manhattan GTO, supra note 78. 
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within thirty days of completing the transaction.82 FinCEN required 
title insurance companies to collect and transmit “information about 
the identity of the individual primarily responsible for representing the 
Purchaser, . . . the identity of the Purchase, . . . [and] the identity of 
the beneficial owner(s) of the Purchaser.”83 Significantly, FinCEN 
defined “beneficial owner” to mean “each individual who, directly or 
indirectly, owns 25% or more of the equity interest in the Purchaser.”84 
FinCEN also required title insurance companies to include the closing 
date, the address, the total purchase price, and the “amount transferred 
in the form of a [monetary instrument].”85 These requirements did not 
preclude cash purchases for expensive residential real property.86 
Rather, these requirements compelled individuals and the beneficial 
owners of limited-liability corporations and other corporations “to 
identify themselves to authorities.”87 
Then-FinCEN Director Jennifer Shasky Calvery justified the 
January 2016 GTOs as part of an effort “to understand the risk that 
corrupt foreign officials, or transnational criminals, may be using 
 
82. FinCEN Miami GTO, supra note 78, at 2; FinCEN Manhattan GTO, 
supra note 78, at 2. 
83. FinCEN Miami GTO, supra note 78, at 2; FinCEN Manhattan GTO, 
supra note 78, at 2. FinCEN defined “Purchaser” to mean “the [legal 
entity] that is purchasing residential real property as part of a Covered 
Transaction.” E.g., FinCEN Miami GTO, supra note 78 at 3. Beneficial 
owners covered in the GTOs include “each individual who, directly or 
indirectly, owns 25% or more of the equity interest in the Purchaser.” 
E.g., FinCEN Miami GTO supra note 78 at 3. Twenty-five percent has 
remained the beneficial-ownership threshold necessary to trigger reporting 
obligations. Frequently Asked Questions, FinCEN (Nov. 15, 2018), 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Real%20Estate%20G
TO%20FAQs_111518_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM2S-EWV6]. 
84. FinCEN Miami GTO, supra note 78, at 3; FinCEN Manhattan GTO, 
supra note 78, at 3; Rena S. Miller & Liana W. Rosen, Cong. 
Research Serv., IF11014, Implementation of Treasury’s New 
Customer Due Diligence Rule: A Step Toward Beneficial 
Ownership Transparency? (2018). 
85. E.g., FinCEN Miami GTO, supra note 78, at 2–3. 
86. Nicholas Nehamas & Rene Rodriguez, How Dirty Is Miami Real Estate? 
Secret Home Deals Dried Up when Feds Started Watching, Miami 
Herald (July 18, 2018, 6:59 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/ 
 business/real-estate-news/article131543514.html [https://perma.cc/G485-
3TTU]. 
87. C. Sean Hundtofte & Ville Rantala, Anonymous Capital Flows and U.S. 
Housing Markets 1 (May 28, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https:// 
 papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3186634 [https://perma.cc/ 
 59Z3-5Q3P]. It bears mention that “[o]nly government officials have 
access to the information [about the identities of beneficial owners in 
residential real estate transactions], not the public.” Nehamas & 
Rodriguez, supra note 86. 
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premium U.S. real estate to secretly invest millions in dirty money.”88 
Although FinCEN’s “rules [had] evolved to make the standard 
mortgage market more transparent and less hospitable to fraud and 
money laundering, . . . cash purchases present a more complex gap.”89 
FinCEN’s decision to focus on title insurance companies stemmed from, 
in its view, the “central role” that title insurers play in residential real 
estate transactions.90 Title insurance companies protect parties to real 
estate transactions “against losses resulting from unknown defects in 
the title to [real] property that occur prior to the closing of a real estate 
transaction” by “cover[ing] the insured party for any covered losses and 
legal fees that might arise” from title defects.91 Thus, title insurers are 
routinely involved in real estate transactions.92 The choice to regulate 
title insurance companies both directs attention to actors who often 
feature prominently in real estate transactions and avoids the 
contentious debate over whether to subject attorneys and realtors to 
the reporting requirements. 
The January 2016 GTOs remained in effect from March 1, 2016 
through August 27, 2016.93 Subsequent GTOs expanded the 
geographical reach, lowered the purchase-price threshold, and 
broadened the list of financial instruments subject to the reporting 
requirements.94 The November 2018 GTO required title insurance 
 
88. FinCEN Takes Aim at Real Estate Secrecy in Manhattan and Miami, 
FinCEN (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/news_ 
 release/20160113.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY3N-BPTB]. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. (“FinCEN is covering certain title insurance companies because title 
insurance is a common feature in the vast majority of real estate 
transactions.”). 
91. Title Insurance, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_title_insurance.htm [https:// 
 perma.cc/5H3G-5SYG]. 
92. FinCEN Takes Aim at Real Estate Secrecy in Manhattan and Miami, 
supra note 88. Lenders “have shown a strong preference for the use of title 
insurance in their lending operations.” Harry Mack Johnson, The Nature 
of Title Insurance, 33 J. Risk & Ins. 393, 410 (1966). 
93. FinCEN Manhattan GTO, supra note 78, at 3; FinCEN Miami GTO, 
supra note 78, at 3. 
94. See, e.g., FinCEN, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Geographic 
Targeting Order: Sample (2016), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/ 
 files/shared/Title_Ins_GTO_Sample_072716.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
 4L7A-XNQW] (expanding the monetary instruments covered by the order 
to include personal checks and business checks, and extending the 
geographic reach of the order to include additional counties and boroughs 
in Florida, New York, Texas, and California); FinCEN, U.S. Dep’t of 
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companies to report to FinCEN identifying information for parties 
involved in transactions for any non-financed residential real property 
with a purchase price of $300,000 or more that take place in one of 
twenty-two counties in nine states.95 Subsequent GTOs have included 
minor adjustments, but the geographic scope, dollar amount, and 
ownership thresholds remain unchanged and are in effect through 
November 2020.96 
 
HBW7]; FinCEN, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Geographic 
Targeting Order: Generic (2017), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/ 
 default/files/shared/Real%20Estate%20GTO%20Order%20-%208.22.17% 
 20Final%20for%20execution%20-%20Generic.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6D8-
FNLD] (subjecting funds transfers, such as wire transfers or automated 
clearing house transfers, to the order, and extending the geographic reach 
of the order to include the city and county of Honolulu, Hawaii); FinCEN, 
supra note 35 (dramatically lowering the dollar threshold for reporting, 
expanding the geographic scope of the order, and subjecting transactions 
funded by virtual currency to the order). 
95. FinCEN, supra note 35, at 1–2. The November 2018 GTO covers 
transactions in the following localities: 
1. The Texas counties of Bexar, Tarrant, or Dallas; 
2. The Florida counties of Miami-Dade, Broward, or Palm Beach; 
3. The Boroughs of Brooklyn, Queens, Bronx, Staten Island, or 
Manhattan in New York City, New York; 
4. The California counties of San Diego, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, San Mateo, or Santa Clara; 
5. The City and County of Honolulu in Hawaii; 
6. The Nevada county of Clark; 
7. The Washington county of King; 
8. The Massachusetts counties of Suffolk, or Middlesex; or 
9. The Illinois county of Cook . . . . 
 Id. 
  Preliminary data suggests that approximately 57% of all new houses 
sold in 2018 sold for $300,000 or more. U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. 
Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev., Monthly New Residential Construction 
January 2019 (2019), https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/pdf/ 
 newresconst.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7J2-D87X]. As of January 2019, the 
median sale price for new residential housing sales was $317,200. Id. The 
median sale price for existing single-family home sales was somewhat 
lower—$249,400—during the same time period. See Median Sales Price 
of Existing Single-Family Homes, Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis (Feb 
21, 2019) https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HSFMEDUSM052N [https:// 
 perma.cc/GC2J-WKZD]. The $300,000 reporting threshold is thus likely 
to capture a significant portion of all future residential real estate sales 
throughout the country. 
96. See FinCEN, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Geographic Targeting Order 
Covering Title Insurance Company (May 14, 2019), https://www.fincen.gov/ 
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FinCEN’s decision to subject to additional scrutiny non-financed 
residential real estate transactions has generated useful information on 
the money laundering risks posed by real property sales.97 During the 
first year it monitored such transactions, FinCEN “found that about 
30[%] of the transactions covered by the GTOs involve a beneficial 
owner or purchaser representative [who] is also the subject of a previous 
suspicious activity report.”98 FinCEN concluded that the proportion of 
suspicious-activity-report filings against people who conduct cash-based 




(extending the November 2018 GTO without changes); FinCEN, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury, Geographic Targeting Order Covering Title Insurance 
Company (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/ 
 fincen-reissues-real-estate-geographic-targeting-orders-12-metropolitan-areas-0 
[https://perma.cc/E85P-FC8G] (exempting real estate transactions made 
by publicly traded U.S. companies but otherwise continuing the previous 
GTO); FinCEN, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Geographic Targeting Order 
Covering Title Insurance Company (May 8, 2020), https://www.fincen 
 .gov/sites/default/files/shared/Generic%20Real%20Estate%20GTO%20
Order%20FINAL%20508_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WQL-W7QQ] (extending 
November 2019 GTO without changes). 
97. See, e.g., FinCEN Renews Real Estate “Geographic Targeting Orders” to 
Identify High-End Cash Buyers in Six Major Metropolitan Areas, FinCEN 
(Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2017-
02/Renewed%20GTO%20NR%20FINAL%20%28Posting%29.pdf [https:// 
 perma.cc/C88W-8UPJ]. 
98. Id. Suspicious activity reports are the vehicle through which financial 
institutions “report known or suspected violations of law or suspicious 
activity.” FinCEN, Guidance on Preparing a Complete & Sufficient 
Suspicious Activity Report Narrative 1 (2003). Suspicious activity 
reports “have been instrumental in enabling law enforcement to initiate 
or supplement major money laundering or terrorist financing investigations 
and other criminal cases” and give FinCEN “a method of identifying 
emerging trends and patterns associated with financial crimes.” Id. 
Financial institutions are required to file suspicious activity reports in 
several circumstances, such as when they detect activity that “[m]ay 
involve potential money laundering or other illegal activity.” Kathryn 
Reed Edge, SARs and PEPs, Tenn. B.J., Aug. 2018, at 26, 26. Being the 
subject of a suspicious activity report is not prima facie evidence of 
financial crime; rather, suspicious activity reports “are intended to report 
certain financial transactions that the financial institution making the 
filing knows or reasonably suspects may violate Federal criminal law or 
that relate to money laundering activity or a violation of the [Bank 
Secrecy Act].” Alex C. Lakatos & Mark G. Hanchet, Confidentiality of 
Suspicious Activity Reports, 124 Banking L.J. 794, 794 (2007). Because 
“banks tend to err on the side of reporting, rather than ignoring marginal 
activity,” suspicious activity reports may reflect financial institutions’ risk 
aversion more than wrongdoing on the customer’s part. See id. at 795. 
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about the use of shell companies to buy luxury real estate in ‘all-cash’ 
transactions.”99 
FinCEN’s implementation and subsequent expansion of reporting 
requirements for title insurance companies has “produc[ed] valuable 
data that is assisting law enforcement and is serving to inform 
[FinCEN’s] future efforts to address money laundering in the real estate 
sector.”100 A 2018 study found that by requiring the title insurance 
companies to report to FinCEN the identities of individuals who own 
25% or more of a company conducting a cash transaction for residential 
real estate, FinCEN introduced scrutiny to an arena that had 
historically received little attention.101 Removing some of the anonymity 
afforded to business entities in the residential real estate market made 
possible the first meaningful estimates of the value that purchasers in 
that market ascribe to anonymity.102 By one estimate, limiting the 
anonymity of residential real estate transactions reduced the volume of 
cash-based shell-company purchases of residential real estate in by 
roughly 70%.103 Limiting the anonymity available to business entities 
did not measurably reduce the total volume of residential real estate 
purchases.104 This observation has supported speculation that when “the 
demand from corporate buyers falls, it is possible that other buyers may 
replace them, and some anonymity-seeking buyers may start buying in 
their own name or [using] alternative methods to hide their identity.”105 
All the same, before the implementation of the GTOs, “[t]he evidence 
on the whole suggests that anonymity-preferring buyers made up the 
majority of corporate cash purchases in the U.S.”106 As a result of the 
GTOs, corporate purchasers of residential real estate have changed 
their behavior: “When buyers are not able to hide their identity from 
 
99. FinCEN Renews Real Estate “Geographic Targeting Orders” to Identify 
High-End Cash Buyers in Six Major Metropolitan Areas, supra note 97. 
Though it captures an aspect of the transactions in question, the “all-
cash” label is misleading: Residential real estate transactions that meet 
the GTOs’ other requirements are covered “[i]f any part of the purchase 
price was made using a method of payment specified in [the GTO].” 
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 80. It would be more accurate to 
say that such transactions are non-financed, or fully liquid. 
100. FinCEN Renews Real Estate “Geographic Targeting Orders” to Identify 
High-End Cash Buyers in Six Major Metropolitan Areas, supra note 97. 
101. See FinCEN, supra note 35, at 3–4. 
102. See Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87, at 1. 
103. Id. at 18 (“[A]ll-cash corporate acquisitions start off at approximately 10% 
of total purchases by dollar volume, then they fall to approximately 2.5% 
of total volume.”). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 23. 
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U.S. authorities, these anonymous capital flows mostly disappear and 
are accompanied by coincident declines in premium housing prices.”107 
Reducing shell companies’ ability to maintain anonymity for their 
beneficial owners has produced potentially negative externalities, as 
well. Preliminary “findings indicate that the market value of luxury 
properties has decreased by billions of dollars, and particularly in the 
areas most affected by regulation.”108 But the reduction in property 
values in covered localities has neither an unequivocally positive nor 
negative moral or political quality. While a lower premium for luxury 
real estate may subvert investor expectations and lead to reduced tax 
receipts, this same shift may make housing “more affordable to local 
residents.”109 
III. Limits to Enlisting Title Insurance Companies in 
the Quest to Prevent Real Estate-based Money 
Laundering 
Despite FinCEN’s improving understanding of both real estate-
based money laundering and the extended reach of the GTOs, 
considerable gaps in that understanding remain.110 The GTOs’ limited 
geographic scope, the ease with which money launderers can avoid the 
beneficial-ownership-reporting threshold, the fact that the GTOs apply 
only to transactions for which parties purchase title insurance, the 
failure to include trusts under the GTOs, and the focus on residential 
real estate to the exclusion of commercial properties all represent 
exploitable gaps in the GTOs.111 
 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 23. 
109. Id. For example, the prevalence of luxury real estate in Miami and its 
power to attract foreign investors in real estate have contributed to 
making Miami “one of the least affordable cities in the United States—
and one of the least affordable in the English-speaking world.” Nicholas 
Nehamas, Buying a Home in Miami-Dade Is So Expensive, It Could Hurt 
the Economy, Miami Herald (Feb. 9, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www 
 .miamiherald.com/news/business/real-estate-news/article131543514.html 
[https://perma.cc/G485-3TTU]. In any event, relying on anonymously 
purchased housing to prop up the residential real estate market runs the 
risk of enlisting entire communities in preserving the corruption, drug 
trafficking, human trafficking, tax evasion, and terrorist financing that 
are often the impetus for money laundering. See generally Reuter & 
Truman, supra note 6. 
110. See, e.g., Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87, at 11. 
111. See id. (identifying trusts, using a greater number of small dollar 
purchases, avoiding the use of title companies, and avoiding jurisdictions 
covered by GTOs as ways for money launderers to avoid the GTOs). 
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A. Narrow Geographic Reach 
The GTOs do not have a broad enough geographic footprint to 
prevent money laundering through residential real estate. Although the 
GTOs have subjected residential real estate in select areas to 
unprecedented scrutiny, residential real estate outside of those areas is 
currently beyond regulators’ reach.112 Little differentiates a residential 
property in Chicago from a similarly priced property in Washington, 
D.C., yet residential property in the nation’s capital is not subject to 
the current GTO’s reporting requirement.113 The GTOs have performed 
a valuable diagnostic function in singling out select urban localities for 
additional scrutiny.114 But despite their diagnostic utility, the GTOs’ 
focus on discrete geographic areas seems more likely to displace, rather 
than prevent, money laundering through residential real estate unless 
they are extended throughout the country.115 
B. High Beneficial Ownership Requirement 
The November 2018 GTO, like its predecessors, requires title 
insurance companies to report identifying information on the natural 
persons who are the beneficial owners of 25% or more of a shell 
company.116 In 2016, the Department of the Treasury considered a rule 
that would have required some financial institutions to disclose the 
identity of beneficial owners who own 10% or more of any included legal 
entity after receiving comments from “non-governmental organizations 
and many individuals [who] asserted that the proposed 25[%] ownership 
threshold is too high and that it should be lowered to 10[%] (or 
eliminated entirely) in the final rule.”117 But in the face of opposition 
 
112. See FinCEN, supra note 35, at 1–2. Residential real estate outside of the 
counties and boroughs enumerated in the GTOs is logically excluded from 
the Nov. 2018 GTO’s coverage. 
113. See id. 
114. See, e.g., Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87. 
115. The concept that areas outside of major metropolitan areas are subject to 
less scrutiny from law enforcement and regulatory bodies has spread to 
popular culture. See, e.g., Ozark, Season 1, Episode 1 (Netflix July 21, 
2017), https://www.netflix.com/watch/80117807?trackId=13752289&tctx= 
 0%2C0%2C721ea219-6066-4fa8-969f-739e1cf23d3f-511708524%2C%2C 
[https://perma.cc/WC2P-DRSS] (“You’re right about Chicago. You got 
the FBI and the ATF and the CIA and they’re all . . . they’re circling 
around Chicago. And they’re tapping phones, and they’re monitoring 
bank accounts, and I just . . . . We need a new hub. I need a new hub. Okay? 
This place [rural Missouri]. It’s away from every single law enforcement 
agency in the U.S. and it’s cash rich.”). 
116. See FinCEN, supra note 35, at 4; see also sources cited supra note 94. 
117. See Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 
Fed. Reg. 29,398, 29,403 (May 11, 2016) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. 
pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, 1026). 
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from private-sector commenters, the Department declined to lower the 
threshold for beneficial ownership to 10%.118 The Treasury 
Department’s less aggressive approach to identifying the beneficial 
owners of legal entities, as some commenters noted, makes it easier for 
money launderers to avoid disclosure requirements.119 By dispersing 
beneficial ownership of a company equally between five or more 
individuals, enterprising anonymity seekers could avoid the November 
2018 GTO’s reporting requirements.120 
C. Properties Without Title Insurance 
Residential real estate buyers who do not purchase title insurance 
are not subject to the November 2018 GTO.121 Lenders often require 
purchasers to obtain title insurance as a condition to issuing 
mortgages.122 Because “[t]itle insurance protects real estate 
purchasers . . . from losses that arise after a real estate settlement, but 
result from unknown liens, encumbrances or other defects [of] the title 
that existed prior to settlement,” ordinary prudence leads many cash 
buyers to obtain title insurance.123 But all-cash purchasers may choose 
to forego title insurance and assume the “unusual but serious perils” of 
obtaining a defective title.124 “[E]xcluding title companies from 
 
118. Id. While 31 C.F.R. § 1010 (2018) does not cover persons involved in real 
estate closings and settlements, the experience of attempting to regulate 
other financial institutions may inform future attempts to impose more 
extensive reporting obligations. 
119. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 29,410. FinCEN noted that commenters “urged FinCEN to lower 
this threshold to 10[%], contending that the higher threshold would be 
too easy to evade and is inconsistent with international AML norms and 
requirements of [the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act]” because “this 
lower threshold would make it more difficult for illicit actors to structure 
ownership interests to evade the reporting threshold.” Id. But FinCEN 
declined to adopt the 10% ownership threshold in its final rule, noting 
that the practice of “collect[ing] beneficial ownership information at a 
threshold lower than 25[%] . . . is [not] widely established enough to 
justify its categorical imposition for all legal entity customers across all 
covered financial institutions.” Id. 
120. Id. 
121. See FinCEN, supra note 35, at 1, 3. 
122. See, e.g., Md. Ins. Admin., A Consumer Guide to Title Insurance 1 
(2019), available at https://insurance.maryland.gov/consumer/documents/ 
 publications/titleinsurancebrochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC9D-4DCW]. 
123. Id. 
124. Johnson, supra note 92. More than other purchasers of real property, 
money launderers and organized criminals may be uniquely well-
positioned to self-insure in the event that they obtain defective title to 
real property, whether by employing parties to conduct title searches 
independently or by intimidating parties into not asserting their rights to 
the property. 
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transactions by declining to purchase title insurance” remains a 
“potential means of working around” the GTO.125 An analysis of 
residential real estate transactions in jurisdictions subject to the GTOs 
found “evidence of statistically significant short-run substitution away 
from title insurance.”126 Researchers identified as much as a “25% initial 
increase in purchases without title insurance” immediately following the 
implementation of the GTOs.127 FinCEN “cannot impose any regulation 
directly on buyers,” but instead must regulate financial institutions.128 
Although making title insurance companies the center of the GTOs was 
a sensible starting point for identifying the natural persons behind 
residential real estate transactions, buyers committed to maintaining 
anonymity are still able to do so—and will be able to do so even if 
FinCEN extends the reach of the GTOs throughout the country. 
D. Failure to Cover Trusts 
Furthermore, legal arrangements like trusts are excluded from the 
definition of “legal entity” under the GTOs and could be used to thwart 
the purposes of the GTO.129 In 2016, FinCEN clarified that “[a]ll trusts, 
no matter the purpose, are outside the definition of a legal entity under 
 
125. Rebecka Manis & Kaitlin Riley Duran, Update: FinCEN Issues Revised 
Regulations that Aim to Discover and Prevent Money Laundering, Schiff 
Hardin (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.schiffhardin.com/insights/publications/ 
 2018/update-fincen-issues-revised-regulations-that-aim-to-discover-and-
prevent-money-laundering [https://perma.cc/U5XX-JLCT]. Declining to 
obtain title insurance “may trigger a duty [for attorneys] to inquire into 
whether . . . the seller is prohibited from doing business with [the 
purchaser].” Id. at n.15. But parties to residential real estate transactions 
who are not represented by counsel are not subject to this additional layer 
of scrutiny. Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87, at 11. 
126. Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87, at 21–22. 
127. Id. at 22 (noting that this phenomenon “recedes to a statistically insignificant 
+18% when a county-price bracket is under a GTO”). 
128. Id. at 9 (observing that FinCEN is only authorized to “issue geographic 
targeting orders for financial institutions); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) 
(2018). 
129. See FinCEN, supra note 35, at 4. FinCEN has justified this different 
treatment on the grounds that the government does not need to be 
involved in forming a trust: 
[U]nlike [other] legal entities . . . , a trust is a contractual 
arrangement between the person who provides the funds or other 
assets and specifies the terms . . . and the person with control over 
the assets . . . , for the benefit of those named in the trust 
deed . . . . Formation of a trust does not generally require any 
action by the state. 
 Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 29,398, 29,412 (May 11, 2016) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 
1020, 1023, 1024, 1026). 
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the GTO.”130 “The type of trustee, individual or corporate, does not” 
affect whether a trust is subject to a GTO’s requirements.131 In similar 
circumstances, FinCEN has reasoned that, with respect to trusts and 
other legal arrangements, financial institutions “may need to take 
additional steps to verify the identity of a customer that is not an 
individual, such as obtaining information about persons with control 
over the account.”132 But the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an 
intergovernmental body of which the United States is a member,133 
found that “[t]he U.S. is an attractive destination for domestic and 
foreign proceeds” in part because “most trustees . . . are not subject to 
comprehensive [AML and counter-terrorist financing] requirements.”134 
Although money launderers have routinely used legal entities in 
complex schemes, “[t]o a much lesser extent, trusts have been identified 
in complex [money laundering] schemes.”135 In its most recent report on 
money laundering risks in the United States, the FATF noted that 
“there is currently no estimate of the number, size [or] activity of U.S. 
trusts as these are not created by governments.”136 The FATF observed 
that trusts were “used to obfuscate the source, ownership, and control 
of illegal proceeds.”137 But despite the challenge that trusts present to 
law enforcement, the FATF concluded that “[n]o mechanism is 
realistically available to authorities to collect [beneficial ownership] 
information on legal arrangements from the trustee or other parties.”138 
The FATF’s recognition that trusts present significant money 
laundering risks highlights the need for additional action to reduce that 
risk. Indeed, the FATF has called for the United States to implement 
 




132. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 29,412 (quoting Customer Identification Programs for Broker-Dealers, 
68 Fed. Reg. 25,113, 25,116 n.30 (May 9, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. 
pt. 103)). 
133. Members and Observers, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/#d.en.3147 [https://perma.cc/ 
 BK5S-MMYN] (last visited June 27, 2020). 
134. Fin. Action Task Force & Asia-Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering, supra note 55, at 18. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. The FATF observed that “the [Bank Secrecy Act] does not impose 
explicit obligations on trustees,” though obligations on trust companies 
“exten[d] to their role as trustees.” Id. at 31. 
137. Id. at 153. 
138. Id. 
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a host of measures to mitigate the risks associated with trusts.139 Among 
its other recommendations, it argues that the United States should 
“[e]nsure that trustees are subject to . . . an explicit obligation to obtain 
and hold adequate, accurate and current information on [the] identity 
of all parties to trusts, including any other natural person exercising 
ultimate effective control over trusts.”140 Thus, renewed attention into 
preventing money laundering through trusts appears to be an important 
component to stanching the flow of illicit funds through real estate in 
the United States.141 
E. Limitation to Residential Real Estate 
The GTOs have only subjected residential real estate transactions 
to additional scrutiny.142 Commercial real estate transactions—all real 
estate transactions except for “real property (including individual units 
of condominiums and cooperatives) designed principally for the 
occupancy of from one to four families”143—are excluded from the GTO 
reporting requirements.144 But in terms of the ease with which money 
launderers can integrate illicitly obtained funds into the legal financial 
system, little differentiates properties “designed principally for the 
occupancy of from one to four families” from larger residential real 
estate developments, or from commercial properties.145 Like residential 
real estate, commercial property “is as attractive to criminals as it is to 
any investor” because it is both “functional . . . [and] provides a veneer 
of respectability, legitimacy, and normality.”146 FinCEN’s 
“disproportionate focus on residential deals may even have 
 
139. See, e.g., id. at 154–55. 
140. Id. at 155. 
141. Although highlighting the challenges trusts present to the enforcement of 
the U.S. AML regime is important to understanding gaps in the GTO 
framework, a comprehensive exploration of more effective ways to prevent 
the use of trusts as vehicles for laundering money is beyond the scope of 
this Note. 
142. See, e.g., FinCEN, supra note 35. 
143. 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1)(A) (2018).  
144. See FinCEN, supra note 35; FinCEN, supra note 30, at 1 n.1 (“Although 
FinCEN to date has focused on residential real estate, money laundering 
can also involve commercial real estate transactions.”). 
145. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 800; Cécile Remeur, 
European Parliament Research Serv., Understanding Money 
Laundering Through Real Estate Transactions 2 (2019). 
146. Remeur, supra note 145 (observing that real estate prices are “generally 
stable and likely to appreciate over time” and that properties can be used 
both for their instrumental value or to “generat[e] income”). 
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unintentionally funneled more fraud into the commercial sector.”147 
More than one-quarter of all commercial real estate transactions are 
conducted on an all-cash basis, a greater proportion than all-cash 
transactions for residential real estate.148 
Money launderers have many opportunities to obscure their 
identity in complex commercial real estate transactions. Commercial 
real estate transactions are “[f]ar more complex than [transactions for] 
residential property.”149 FinCEN’s focus on residential properties may 
stem from its assessment that financial institutions can more easily 
identify suspicious behavior in residential real estate transactions.150 
Commercial real estate may be “more vulnerable to abuse” because 
commercial real estate transactions routinely feature more “complex 
ownership structures” than residential deals.151 Unlike commercial real 
estate transactions, “[i]n residential real estate, closings work in a very 
systematic way.”152 Commercial real estate transactions “generally 
[involve] more parties.”153 Companies engaging in commercial real estate 
transactions “usually have more decision makers on both sides of the 
deal.”154 The presence of tenants can further complicate commercial real 
estate transactions.155 Pricing information is often not readily available 
for commercial properties: as many as 70% of commercial properties 
 
147. Katherine Clarke & E.B. Solomont, NYC’s Dirty Money Files, Real 
Deal (Oct. 3, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://therealdeal.com/issues_articles/ 
 nycs-dirty-money-files/ [https://perma.cc/3KT4-PE9L]. 
148. Compare George Ratiu, Cash Accounts for 26 Percent of Commercial 
Transactions in REALTOR® Markets, Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors (June 
30, 2016), http://economistsoutlook.blogs.realtor.org/2016/06/30/cash-
accounts-for-26-percent-of-commercial-transactions-in-realtor-markets/ 
[https://perma.cc/6ETN-4ZHW], with Scholastica (Gay) Cororaton, Fewer 
Cash Sales, Investor Buyers, and Distressed Sales in 2017, Nat’l Ass’n 
of Realtors (Feb. 5, 2018), http://economistsoutlook.blogs.realtor.org/ 
 2018/02/05/fewer-cash-sales-investor-buyers-and-distressed-sales-in-2017/ 
[https://perma.cc/V5FA-7TPB] (noting that all-cash transactions accounted 
for 23% of all residential real estate transactions in 2016, and that “[t]he 
share of cash sales . . . continued to trend down, to 21[%]in 2017”). 
149. Simon Bloom & Shannon Oliver, 10 Pitfalls in Commercial Real Estate 
Transactions, Construction Fin. Mgmt. Ass’n (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www 
 .cfma.org/content.cfm?ItemNumber=5234 [https://perma.cc/7JSX-U2FM]. 
150. Clarke & Solomont, supra note 147. 
151. Id. 
152. Differences Between Commercial and Residential Real Estate Transactions, 
Landmark Title Assurance Agency (Aug. 3, 2016), https://ltaz.com/ 
 real-estate-tips/commercial-residential-real-estate-transactions [https:// 
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listed for rent do not have an asking price.156 Against this backdrop, 
money launderers may find it easier to overpay for commercial 
properties.157 Relative to the challenges posed by residential real 
property, regulators remain comparatively ignorant of the extent to 
which commercial real estate transactions pose money laundering 
risks.158 
Thus, the GTOs contain numerous gaps that allow money 
launderers to avoid reporting requirements and remain anonymous. 
Early evidence suggests that purchasers who wish to remain anonymous 
have adjusted their behavior in response to the GTO disclosure 
requirements.159 Some of these characteristics, such as the limited 
geographic scope and exclusion of non-residential properties, support 
broadening the coverage of the title insurance company reporting 
requirements. Maintaining and expanding the GTOs’ requirements is 
desirable because it would give law enforcement ready access to 
information on real estate transactions shortly after they occur.160 But 
the challenges presented by parties who avoid title insurance and who 
have no single owner with a 25% or greater beneficial ownership interest 
are structural limits that preserve anonymity. Because of the inherent 
limitations that intermediaries like title insurance companies have in 
preventing money laundering through shell companies, denying money 
launderers access to the U.S. real estate market will require additional 
action. FinCEN can expand the coverage of its real estate rules through 
 
156. Jackie Swift, The Behavior of Commercial Real Estate, Cornell U.: 
Cornell Res., https://research.cornell.edu/news-features/behavior-
commercial-real-estate [https://perma.cc/W2XZ-HTNA] (last visited June 
27, 2020) (reporting that, in the commercial real estate context, “owners 
routinely put buildings on the market without indicating the asking price”). 
157. Overpayment is a common money laundering tool. Money launderers have 
used similar methods to launder money by overcharging for goods and 
services. See, e.g., Joseph A. Mann, Money Launderers Wash Billions 
Through International Trade, Miami Herald (May 11, 2009) https:// 
 miamiherald.newsbank.com/doc/news/1281EC27855DB3F8?search_ter
ms=Money+launderers+wash+billions+through+international+trade&t
ext=Money launderers wash billions through international trade&pub% 
 5B0%5D=MIHB&pdate=2009-05-11 [https://perma.cc/5FNN-ZRHM] 
(“[M]y partner in Latin America spends $1,000 to buy 10,000 pencils at 
[ten] cents each and ships them to me in Miami. The invoice says the 
pencils are worth $100 each[;] I pay my partner $1 million. That way, I’m 
able to move $1 million out of the country.”). The same basic mechanism 
for laundering money through goods and services can extend to 
overpayment for real estate. 
158. See Terrorism, Transnat’l Crime & Corruption Ctr., Money 
Laundering in Real Estate 39 (2018). 
159. Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87, at 19. 
160. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 1010.520 (2018) (requiring financial institutions and 
government agencies to share information with one another). 
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rulemaking, but complementary legislative action is needed to deny 
anonymity to shell company owners. 
Rather than focus exclusively on preventing real estate-based 
money laundering through financial institutions, a legislative solution 
that requires shell companies to identify their beneficial owners to the 
federal government would provide better, broader, and more useful 
information to law enforcement. 
IV. Legislative Solutions 
Information generated by the GTOs targeting residential real estate 
sales supports the view that individuals who seek anonymity are 
rational actors who are willing to change their behavior to preserve that 
anonymity.161 The public interest in affording this particular species of 
anonymity to individuals, however, is negligible; whereas the risks are 
considerable.162 Federal law already protects the privacy of consumer 
financial data.163 Furthermore, the Department of the Treasury can 
impose penalties on financial institutions that fail to safeguard customer 
privacy.164 As the technological and logistical hurdles to identifying 
beneficial owners have become less onerous in the decades since the 
 
161. See generally Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87; Nicholas Gilmour, 
Understanding the Practices Behind Money Laundering—A Rational 
Choice Interpretation, 44 Int’l J.L. Crime & Justice 1 (2016); Alberto 
Chong & Florencio López-de-Silanes, Money Laundering and its 
Regulations 6 (Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper No. 
590, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1820066 
[https://perma.cc/8J98-Q8L2] (“If money launderers are rational profit-
maximizers, like other criminals, deterrence is essential in order to curtail 
their behavior.”). 
162. Jodi Vittori, How Anonymous Shell Companies Finance Insurgents, 
Criminals, and Dictators, Ctr. for Security Studies (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/ 
 cc9d6a76-aec2-442b-892e-92825a7dbdd1 [https://perma.cc/6V9W-S4CM] 
(“Because of the secrecy they can provide, anonymous companies represent 
an important nexus of corruption, money laundering, transnational organized 
crime, and terrorism, which directly harm U.S. interests.”). 
163. See FinCEN, Feasibility of a Cross-Border Electronic Funds 
Transfer Reporting System under the Bank Secrecy Act 23 
(2006) (discussing the laws that “control the collection and use of data by 
government agencies with the aim of protecting the privacy of individual 
persons”), available at https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=472174 [https:// 
 perma.cc/9NGT-VTE6]; see also Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 
U.S.C. §§ 3401–22 (2018); Federal Information Security Management Act 
(codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–49 (2018); Bank Secrecy Act, 
31 U.S.C. § 5319 (2018). 
164. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09 (2018); Robert W. Anderson, Federal Data 
Privacy and Cybersecurity Laws, Lindabury (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://www.lindabury.com/firm/articles-resources/federal-data-privacy-
cybersecurity-laws.html [https://perma.cc/K7NN-L6QE]. 
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enactment of the BSA and the USA PATRIOT Act, the anonymity 
beneficial owners enjoy appears not to be a policy worth preserving for 
its own sake but simply a historical accident stemming from the 
difficulty of obtaining that information.165 Contrasted with other 
desirable shell company attributes—such as limited liability, 
preferential tax treatment, and estate planning benefits—it is difficult 
to find independent grounds to justify beneficial owner anonymity from 
governmental agencies as a public virtue.166 This is especially true 
because American business entities are creations of the states.167 
By only permitting FinCEN to impose requirements on financial 
institutions, the BSA limits the scope of federal action.168 Even within 
the range of potential actions available under existing law, FinCEN has 
been cautious to avoid promulgating burdensome rules.169 Through the 
GTOs, FinCEN has emphasized small, easily attainable goals in its 
efforts to reduce money laundering through real estate.170 But these 
 
165. See Fin. Action Task Force, Transparency and Beneficial Owner–
ship 7 (2014) (noting that “company structures that promote complexity 
and increase the difficulty for authorities to obtain accurate beneficial 
ownership information (e.g., shell companies and bearer shares)” may 
pose greater money laundering risks), available at http://www.fatf-gafi. 
 org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-transparency-beneficial-
ownership.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HXX-WVZH]. 
166. See, e.g., Metcalfe, supra note 40; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 
107–08 (1985) (arguing that limited liability encourages risk-averse investors 
to engage in productive enterprise). An important distinction should be 
drawn between privacy from the general public and privacy from federal 
agencies like FinCEN. Valid policy concerns support maintaining 
anonymity from the general public, as “[t]here are numerous cases in 
which foreign taxpayers have been attacked and even killed when outside 
parties have learned about their particular holdings and assets.” See 
Metcalfe, supra note 40, at 253. Any attempt to deny anonymity to 
beneficial owners must account for the competing interest in allowing 
individuals to keep their affairs private from their neighbors while 
permitting the government to collect valuable information to identify 
potential money launderers. 
167. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational 
Corporations, 15 Del. J. Corp. L. 283, 293 (1990) (describing a view of 
corporations as “a separate juridical unit created by state action, an 
artificial creature of the state possessing in addition to its essential ‘core’ 
attributes only such limited powers as are granted by the state”); Carliss 
N. Chatman, The Corporate Personhood Two-Step, 18 Nev. L.J. 811, 812 
(2018) (“Corporations are defined by state law, and have rights incidental 
to that status. Corporations also have rights defined by statutes.”). 
168. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2018). 
169. See Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 
Fed. Reg. 29,398, 29,408–15 (May 11, 2016) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. 
pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, and 1026). 
170. Clarke & Solomont, supra note 147. 
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easily attainable goals reflect a small subsection of all real estate-based 
money laundering; and they have displaced, rather than reduced or 
eliminated, behaviors consistent with money laundering through real 
estate.171 
Some states have engaged in an anonymity-promoting “race to the 
bottom.”172 Delaware, Wyoming, and Nevada “have resisted the 
imposition of increased transparency and oversight mechanisms.”173 
Unlike larger states, which “persist in viewing corporation laws as 
complex moral and political problems,” smaller states like Delaware 
have viewed corporate laws as “a way of making everybody rich.”174 
Because states have strong financial incentives to promote company 
formation under their laws, individual states are unlikely to lead the 
charge for corporate transparency.175 
Federal legislative action is thus the best candidate for meaningfully 
reducing money laundering through real estate. Since 2008, numerous 
bills have attempted to address the anonymity that allows money 
laundering to thrive.176 The 2019 iteration of the Corporate 
 
171. Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87, at 21. 
172. Michel, supra note 44, at 3 (“America’s transformation into a haven for 
financial anonymity has arisen in no small part due to the efforts of a 
handful of . . . state-level governments.”); Tax Justice Network, 
Financial Secrecy Index 2018: Narrative Report on USA 1, 6 (2018). 
173. Michel, supra note 44, at 16 (noting that these jurisdictions “have jump-
started the U.S.’s transformation into a stalwart of financial secrecy and 
obscurantism”). 
174. Id. (quoting L.J. Davis, Delaware Inc., N.Y. Times (June 5, 1988), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/05/magazine/delaware-inc.html? 
 pagewanted=all&mtrref=undefined [https://perma.cc/5Y2G-4LNB]). 
175. Tax Justice Network, supra note 172 (noting that, “from the states’ 
perspectives, the end game is to raise revenue for the state by creaming 
off fees from large numbers of companies incorporating there—and the 
consequences for everyone else are not considered: a typical offshore 
attitude,” and that “[t]he lobbying and the revenue-raising potential and 
the lack of strong democratic counterweights in small states[] mean that 
these places can be fairly described as ‘captured states’”). But see Michel, 
supra note 44, at 16–17 (noting that “the growing media focus on 
Delaware’s incorporation regulations” has led Delaware legislators to 
“push to build new transparency mechanisms within their incorporation 
industry,” but acknowledging that “financial secrecy experts have 
described Delaware’s pledged changes as little more than ‘window-
dressing’”); Clark Gascoigne, Delaware Bills ‘Mere Window-Dressing,’ 
Will Do Nothing to Curb Abuse of Anonymous Companies, Global Fin. 
Integrity (June 10, 2014), https://www.gfintegrity.org/press-release/ 
 delaware-bills-mere-window-dressing-will-nothing-curb-abuse-anonymous-
companies/ [https://perma.cc/G8HN-E3AB]. 
176. See Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 
2956, 110th Cong. (2008); S. 569, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 6098, 111th 
Cong. (2010); S. 1483, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 3416, 112th Cong. (2011); 
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Transparency Act would require “corporations and LLCs . . . to 
disclose their beneficial owners to . . . FinCEN, which would then share 
that information with law enforcement and financial institutions.”177 
The Corporate Transparency Act specifically targets shell companies, 
excluding several company types from disclosure requirements.178 
But despite bipartisan support for legislation that would compel 
shell companies to disclose the identities of their beneficial owners, 
Congress has not enacted any of the bills that would accomplish this 
goal.179 Disagreements over the appropriate channels through which to 
compel disclosure appear to be at least partly responsible for the 
impasse. The True Incorporation Transparency of Law Enforcement 
(TITLE) Act180 would require states, as opposed to federal agencies, to 
collect beneficial ownership information at the time of a company’s 
formation, and would expand the definition of financial institutions 
under the BSA to include “any person engaged in the business of 
forming corporations or limited liability companies.”181 A competing 
 
S. 1465, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 3331, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 2489, 
114th Cong. (2016); H.R. 4450, 114th Cong. (2016); True Incorporation 
Transparency for Law Enforcement Act, S. 1454, 115th Cong. (2017); 
Corporate Transparency Act, H.R. 3089, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 1717, 
115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 2513, 116th Cong. (2019). 
177. Kevin Sun & David Jeans, Congress Re-examines Bill that Would Expose 
Beneficial Owners of LLCs, Real Deal (Mar. 13, 2019, 6:15 PM), 
https://therealdeal.com/2019/03/13/congress-re-examines-bill-that-would-
expose-beneficial-owners-of-llcs/ [https://perma.cc/M2XJ-XD7F]; see also 
Corporate Transparency Act, H.R. 2513. 
178. Sun & Jeans, supra note 177. The Corporate Transparency Act proposes 
to exempt most businesses that are regulated by other disclosure-
compelling rules, including businesses subject to, for example, the 
Securities Exchange Act or the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, among 
others. H.R. 2513 § 5333(d)(4)(C). The Corporate Transparency Act 
would also exempt businesses with “a physical office within the United 
States” that “employs more than [twenty] employees on a full-time basis 
in the United States” and conducts more than $5 million in business. Id. 
§ 5333(d)(4)(C)(xiv). Theoretically, these carve-outs define shell companies 
by what they are not, and do not exempt businesses whose decision 
makers are subject to other anonymity-denying regulations. 
179. Shruti Shah, Six Bills in Congress (so far) Target Anonymous Companies, 
Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Blog (Aug. 9, 2017, 7:28 AM), http:// 
 www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/8/9/shruti-shah-six-bills-in-congress-so-
far-target-anonymous-co.html [https://perma.cc/4HZJ-QLR2]. 
180. S. 1454, 115th Cong. (2017). 
181. Shah, supra note 179; S. 1454, 115th Cong. § 4(a)(3)(Z) (2017); Sun & 
Jeans, supra note 177. The TITLE Act would condition funding offered 
to states under the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant 
program on requiring that form “a corporation or limited liability 
company to provide information about its beneficial owners.” Summary: 
True Incorporation Transparency for Law Enforcement Act or the TITLE 
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proposal “would designate the Internal Revenue Service [as] the point 
of collection instead” of FinCEN, ostensibly because “this would be a 
more efficient way of collecting [beneficial ownership] information.”182 
But critics of this proposal have noted that this would require law 
enforcement “to obtain a search warrant to coordinate with the Internal 
Revenue Service” to identify the beneficial owners of shell companies.183 
The competing bills primarily disagree over questions of efficiency. 
Because states could condition the formation of business entities on 
receiving identifying information about beneficial ownership, states 
stand in a strong position to collect that information in the first 
instance. But the TITLE Act would require states to give beneficial 
ownership information to FinCEN only upon a written request.184 The 
TITLE Act does not specify whether such requests would need to be 
tailored to individual companies or whether FinCEN could make 
blanket requests to obtain all beneficial ownership information in a 
state’s possession.185 The TITLE Act’s focus on regulating shell 
companies by expanding the definition of financial institutions risks a 
narrow regulatory interpretation of “person engaged in the business of 
forming corporations or limited liability companies” that would 
undermine the efficacy of the legislation to identify all beneficial owners 
of shell companies.186 Moreover, resting the responsibility for collecting 
beneficial ownership information with states creates the risk that 
inconsistent approaches to information collection will impede FinCEN’s 
ability to assist law enforcement in fast-moving criminal investigations. 
Furthermore, states hoping to differentiate themselves as secrecy 
havens could simply choose to forego the funding available under the 
TITLE Act. The TITLE Act thus contains numerous shortcomings that 
undermine its ability to prevent anonymous shell company ownership. 
Similarly, requiring the IRS to collect beneficial ownership 
information makes a degree of intuitive sense. Unlike with FinCEN, 
 
Act, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-
bill/1454 [https://perma.cc/UJ56-APRD] (last visited June 27, 2020). 
182. Sun & Jeans, supra note 177. 
183. House Financial Services Subcommittee Hearing on Proposals to Detect 




184. S. 1454 § 531(a)(1)(D)(iii). 
185. See id. 
186. See S. 1454 § 4(a)(3)(Z). Without a robust definition that requires everyone 
who forms or registers a corporation, limited liability company, or other 
business entity to disclose beneficial ownership information, the TITLE 
Act proposal risks encountering the same shortcomings as requiring title 
insurance companies to collect beneficial ownership information. 
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companies routinely file documents with the IRS.187 But without 
modification, the logistical impediments to effective law enforcement 
would be even more pronounced, as FinCEN would otherwise require 
search warrants to obtain beneficial ownership information.188 
Rather than address the problem of anonymous beneficial 
ownership through financial institutions, which have proven to be 
imperfect proxies in the quest to root out illicit actors,189 an approach 
that requires shell companies to identify beneficial owners on the threat 
of civil and criminal penalties cuts to the heart of the issue. The 
Corporate Transparency Act would accomplish this goal, albeit through 
the logistically puzzling mechanism of requiring covered companies to 
report directly to FinCEN.190 Requiring companies to file paperwork 
directly with FinCEN could easily become a trap for the unwary, 
exposing to civil and criminal liability parties who pose little-to-no 
money laundering risk. Moreover, the IRS already collects large 
amounts of information from the public.191 Congress could easily resolve 
this tension through a small statutory tweak. Namely, Congress could 
require shell companies to submit identifying information for beneficial 
owners to the IRS at regular intervals while also requiring the IRS to 
share that identifying information with FinCEN. Not only would this 
approach minimize the burden on those who use shell companies for 
legitimate purposes, it would allow FinCEN ready access to data that 
would both support ongoing investigations into financial crimes and 
enable FinCEN to develop quantitative models of shell company 
behavior. In this sense, splitting the difference between FinCEN and 
the IRS would produce better outcomes for both the public and law 
enforcement. Requiring shell companies to produce the identity of their 
beneficial ownership could also facilitate the due diligence efforts of 
other financial institutions.192 And requiring shell companies to identify 
their own beneficial owners would theoretically reduce the burden of 
identifying individuals who own a smaller portion of the shell company; 
thus increasing the difficulty that money launderers would face in 
 
187. See Sun & Jeans, supra note 177; The Agency, its Mission and Statutory 
Authority, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/about-irs/the-agency-its-mission-and-
statutory-authority [https://perma.cc/8FB3-DLYS] (last updated Feb. 
26, 2020) (“In fiscal year 2015, the IRS collected almost $3.3 trillion in 
revenue and processed almost 240 million tax returns.”). 
188. See House Financial Services Subcommittee Hearing on Proposals to Detect 
and Deter Financial Crimes, supra note 183. 
189. See id. 
190. H.R. 2513, 116th Cong. § 5333(a)(1)(A) (2019). Requiring shell companies to 
report information directly to FinCEN would logically increase the burden 
on those who create and maintain shell companies by requiring them to 
file paperwork with an additional government agency. 
191. The Agency, its Mission and Statutory Authority, supra note 187. 
192. Shah, supra note 179. 
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skirting reporting requirements by distributing ownership so that no 
one beneficial owner owns more than 25% of the company.193 
Significantly, requiring shell companies to report their beneficial 
owners to a federal agency under the Corporate Transparency Act 
would ameliorate concerns about AML regulations interfering with the 
attorney-client relationship and the duty of confidentiality. Whereas 
the American Bar Association objected to the Incorporation 
Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act on the grounds 
that it would expand the BSA’s definition of “financial institutions” to 
include “formation agents,”194 the Corporate Transparency Act would 
create a duty for shell companies, not the lawyers who serve them, to 
disclose beneficial ownership information.195 Rather than incorporating 
attorneys into the AML regulation system in a way that could interfere 
with their professional obligations, the Corporation Transparency Act 
framework goes to the source of shell company anonymity without 
implicating attorneys’ professional-responsibility concerns. 
Gaps would still remain under this proposal. Despite the proposed 
penalties for failing to disclose updated beneficial ownership 
information, money launderers may well give inaccurate, misleading, or 
incomplete ownership information.196 Money launderers could come to 
rely more heavily on straw buyers—individuals “who allow [their] name, 
identifiers, and credit rating to be used to . . . purchase . . . real 
property.”197 But because these gaps are already the subject of AML 
 
193. See supra note 83 (discussing the beneficial ownership threshold which 
triggers reporting requirements under the Nov. 2018 GTO). 
194. Letter from Paulette Brown, President, American Bar Association, to 
Michael G. Fitzpatrick and Stephen F. Lynch (May 24, 2016), available 
at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/ 
 2016may24_gatekeeperregandtheprofession.authcheckdam.pdf [https:// 
 perma.cc/E5QZ-GG87]. 
195. H.R. 2531 § 5333(a)(1)(A). 
196. See J.W. Verret, Terrorism Finance, Business Associations, and the 
“Incorporation Transparency Act”, 70 La. L. Rev. 857, 909 (2010) 
(arguing that the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement 
Assistance Act “is founded on an erroneous assumption of reliable self-
reporting of ownership information from individuals who are simultaneously 
engaged in fraud”). This same basic criticism applies to all self-reporting 
requirements. But Verret’s argument loses its persuasive gusto when self-
reporting requirements are characterized not as ways to obtain perfect 
information from dishonest actors, but as ways to limit the extent to 
which these actors can use legal services to carry out their objectives. 
197. FinCEN, Suspected Money Laundering in the Residential Real 
Estate Industry 1 n.3 (2008) (Though the term “straw buyer” has 
historically referred to individuals who obtain mortgages on property on 
behalf of an undisclosed party, the underlying principle is the same 
regardless of how the property is financed: “The straw buyer generally 
understands that he will neither occupy the property nor make payments 
on [a] loan,” and “is general paid a fee” by the putative fraudster). 
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and law-enforcement investigative methods and reflect a degree of 
dishonesty that would ordinarily require a more detailed, contextual 
understanding of parties to any given transaction, the gaps are unlikely 
to be solved through changes in a reporting regime. Rather, beneficial 
ownership reporting would supplement existing AML regulations and 
law-enforcement strategies. Mandatory beneficial ownership reporting 
need not replace the duties FinCEN imposes on title companies to 
report on all-cash transactions because title insurance companies might 
still encounter suspicious behavior indicative of criminal conduct. 
Instead, mandatory beneficial ownership reporting would emphasize the 
role of shell companies while reducing the comparative burdens on title 
insurance companies. Requiring shell companies to report their 
beneficial ownership while also requiring title companies to report 
suspicious activity to FinCEN for commercial and residential real estate 
transactions would reflect a significantly more robust AML regime. 
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